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Onderco, M.; Wagner, W.M.

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OF HAWKS AND DOVES
Mapping Policies toward Iran and North Korea

Michal Onderco and **Wolfgang Wagner**

The policies toward countries aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons continue to be heavily contested, differing even among countries that consider nuclear proliferation as one of the main threats to international security. This article maps the actual policies of liberal democracies toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum from confrontation to accommodation. Using data from an expert survey, the authors outline four main findings. First, policies toward both Iran and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time. Second, no policy convergence was observed among the states studied; that is, notwithstanding the adoption of joint sanctions, differences remained between states preferring confrontation and those opting for accommodation. Third, states maintained remarkably stable policy profiles over time. Finally, despite obvious differences between the norm violations of North Korea and Iran, states generally followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries. The authors' findings indicate that states exhibit stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation toward nuclear aspirants. Although a comprehensive examination of the causes of these policy differences is beyond the scope of this article, the authors present evidence that a major cleavage exists between members and non-members of the Non-Aligned Movement, indicating that the degree to which nuclear aspirants' sovereignty should be respected is a main issue of contention.

KEYWORDS: North Korea; Iran; treaty compliance; nonproliferation; Non-Aligned Movement; nuclear weapons

Whether the nuclear nonproliferation regime succeeds in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states depends to a considerable extent on the strategic interaction between the international community and "nuclear aspirants"—states like Iran and North Korea, who violated the norms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), indicating both a capability and an interest in developing nuclear weapons. The decision of North Korea about whether to acquire nuclear weapons or to abandon its respective programs depends at least in part on the policies of the international community. However, what the appropriate policy response to nuclear aspirants should be has been heavily contested, even among liberal democracies that generally share the perception of nuclear proliferation as one of the foremost threats to international security. As students of the security dilemma have pointed out, interpreting other states' intentions is already a demanding challenge, but even if the "dilemma of interpretation" is resolved, a "dilemma of response" remains.[1] In general, states can opt for either a confrontational or an accommodationist policy in response to a threat posed by another state.

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The confrontational strategy is based on the idea that threats can and should be deterred. A state's undesired actions, such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons, should be made as costly as possible because the higher the costs, the more likely a cost-benefit-calculating actor will back down. Sanctions serve the dual purpose of making undesired actions costly and signaling a resolve to not tolerate any further provocations.

In contrast, an accommodationist strategy starts from the notion that the security dilemma exists for both parties in a confrontation. As a consequence, the ''opponent'' state's policies are seen primarily as reactions to the other state's policies under conditions of uncertainty and possibly driven by fears about its own survival. Instead of simply assuming that one's own actions have to be acknowledged as defensive by the opponent, an accommodationist strategy accepts that one's own actions can be interpreted as offensive. In this case, the opponent's policies may result from the mistaken interpretation that it needs enhanced efforts to guarantee its security in the face of a growing threat. An accommodationist policy then aims at de-escalating the conflict by signaling reassurance to the opponent. Addressing an opponent state's security concerns (e.g., by guaranteeing nonaggression) thus lies at the heart of an accommodationist policy. In addition, economic incentives may be used to exchange economic gains from trade or technology transfer for political concessions. In contrast to sanctions, economic incentives can lead beneficiaries in the target state to ally with the sender state and thus encourage cooperation.[2]

The debate about an appropriate policy response to Iran and North Korea clearly illustrates the different rationales. A confrontational strategy assumes that sanctions, or even the threat of possible military action, can make the development of nuclear weapons too costly for either state to merit further investments into the program. This approach was exemplified by President George W. Bush, who not only revived the stigmatizing label of ''rogue state'' for Iran and North Korea, but also placed both states on an ''axis of evil.'' According to Bush, ''the Iranians need to feel the pressure from the world that any nuclear weapons program will be uniformly condemned.''[3] In contrast, an accommodationist strategy points to the precarious security situations of both Iran and North Korea. Iran has faced a hostile neighborhood for a long time, while Russian and Chinese support for North Korea decreased with the end of the Cold War. From an accommodationist perspective, the US-led intervention in Iraq can be understood as a reason for Tehran or Pyongyang to acquire nuclear weapons because the invasion signaled the resolve to topple the regime of any ''rogue state'' that the US president considers part of an ''axis of evil.'' An accommodationist strategy would therefore aim at reassuring Iran and North Korea of the accommodating state's non-aggressive intentions, thereby removing the reason to acquire nuclear weapons. Instead of sticks (such as sanctions), carrots are the main policy instruments of any accommodationist strategy. This approach is exemplified by the European Union's 2003 strategy against WMD proliferation, which holds that the ''best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them.''[4] With a view to Iran, Gerhard Schröder, then chancellor of Germany, told the Munich Security Conference that ''Iran will only abandon its nuclear ambitions for good if not only its economic but also its legitimate security interests are safeguarded.''[5]

Neither strategy is guaranteed to succeed, or to fail. As international relations scholar Robert Jervis has pointed out, an accommodationist policy can successfully

prevent a situation from spiraling into conflict if the target state is prepared to de-escalate in response to reassuring and conciliatory moves.[6] However, if the target state is committed to pursuing its course (e.g., acquiring nuclear weapons), then an accommodationist policy will be understood as a sign of weakness and further encourage the target state.

In a similar vein, theorist James Davis has argued that promises, in contrast to threats, may even increase the demands of the target state if it is driven by a sense of strategic opportunity. However, states who are "motivated to challenge the status quo by fear of losses and a sense of strategic vulnerability are best influenced through the use of assurances and promised rewards."[7]

In his analysis of economic coercion, political scientist Daniel Drezner found that it is the target state's expectation of future conflict that influences the success of inducements or sanctions. In 1994, North Korea expected future conflict with the United States, making concessions unacceptable. According to Drezner, North Korea would only give up its nuclear program in exchange for a substantial carrot (the delivery of nuclear reactors and heavy oil worth $5 billion)—but not in response to economic sanctions.[8]

Even though scholars may disagree over the specifics of a target state's motivation (that is, whether it seeks opportunity or expects future conflict), research on sanctions and economic coercion suggests that the success or failure of either accommodation or confrontation depends mostly on these motivations. However, as students of the security dilemma remind us, the true motivation of any government is difficult if not impossible to establish; this creates the dilemma of interpretation that lies at the heart of the security dilemma. Examples of misinterpretations abound. Proponents of confrontational strategy sometimes point to one of the most prominent cases of failed accommodation: the appeasement of Nazi Germany, which resulted from a misinterpretation of the motives driving Hitler and his cronies. By the same token, advocates of an accommodationist policy have pointed out that US policy toward Iran may have been self-fulfilling, in that it may have created the very threat it was designed to deter.[9]

Given the difficulties of discovering a government's true motivation, it may not be surprising that liberal democracies have quarreled over the appropriate course of action regarding the apparent nuclear aspirations of Tehran and Pyongyang. The aim of this article is not to discuss the merits and shortcomings of either confrontational or accommodationist strategies. Instead, we are interested in mapping the *actual* policies of liberal democracies toward Iran and North Korea along a continuum that stretches from confrontation on one end to accommodation on the other. In so doing, we hope to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the strategic interactions between nuclear aspirants and the international community, which we consider a crucial element in the success or failure of nonproliferation. Systematic comparative studies have advanced our understanding of the forces driving potential nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons (or to refrain from doing so).[10] However, the confrontational or accommodationist policies formed in response to nuclear aspirants remain understudied.

The lack of comparative quantitative studies of foreign policies toward "nuclear aspirants" such as Iran and North Korea is partly due to the difficulties in measuring degrees of confrontation or accommodation.[11] Although states' particular policies may be

obvious to educated observers, they often do not translate into observable (and thus measurable) indicators that could form the basis for a systematic analysis. The main reason for this is that states act strategically toward nuclear aspirants: whether they prefer accommodation or confrontation, states generally benefit from a common, unified position toward aspiring nuclear powers; such unity improves states' bargaining position. States crafting policy regarding nuclear aspirants therefore have incentives to find compromises and keep their differences quiet. This is reflected in states' voting behavior on the UN Security Council or on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors: resolutions condemning nuclear aspirants' noncompliance or even imposing sanctions are usually carried by large majorities that result from sometimes lengthy and cumbersome negotiations.[12]

These large majorities, however, do not reflect the differences in policy preferences. As a consequence, roll-call data are of little use in identifying different degrees of accommodation or confrontation.[13] In addition, voting on the IAEA Board of Governors is often done by the raising of hands, individual votes are not officially recorded, and only aggregated data are published officially. With the help of an expert survey, this article aims to redress this problem by mapping the policy preferences of thirty-five democracies toward Iran from 2002 to 2009 and of twenty-two democracies toward North Korea from 1993 to 2009.

An expert survey offers a promising avenue on which to explore state policies toward Iran and North Korea; it creates the possibility of a reliable, valid assessment of various states' preferences in contemporary international disputes that can be compared cross-sectionally with temporal variation. The next section will give a brief overview of the previous uses of expert surveys in political science. We then introduce our own survey and discuss some of its methodological aspects related to sampling, data collection, and survey design, as well as its reliability and validity. Our survey yielded four main findings that we then discuss in turn. First, policies toward Iran and North Korea have become increasingly confrontational over time. Second, there has been no policy convergence among the states we studied; that is, notwithstanding the adoption of joint sanctions, states continued to differ regarding their preferences for confrontation or accommodation. Third, countries maintained remarkably stable policy profiles, remaining either more (or less) confrontational in comparison to other states at a given time. Fourth, despite differences between the norm violations committed by North Korea and those by Iran, states in general followed remarkably similar policies toward both countries at any point in time. All in all, our findings indicate that countries have remarkably stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation.

Use of Expert Surveys

Expert surveys have been generally acknowledged as an inexpensive, relatively easy-to-administer way to gather highly relevant data on topical issues.[14] Another advantage of an expert survey is that it does not require a specific data source (such as UN and IAEA voting

records, as used in the example above) and is available for all cases for which experts are available, which is not necessarily the case with other data.[15]

Most expert surveys have come from the field of comparative politics, in which expert surveys have been extensively used as a means to establish party positions on specific issues (most often, European integration).[16] However, expert surveys have also been used in other fields of political science, including comparative foreign policy: political scientist Eoin O'Malley used expert surveys to measure the power of 139 prime ministers in twenty-two parliamentary democracies over twenty years.[17] In the study, O'Malley looked at the influence prime ministers exercised over the policy output of their governments and their ability to "get their 'preferred policies enacted.'"[18] Furthermore, expert surveys were used to study the outcomes of particular crises for national governments.[19] International relations scholars Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow solicited thirty-four expert assessments of thirty-three crises over twenty-five years, asking experts what impact a particular crisis had on an actor's national interests (on a scale from significantly advanced to significantly hindered) and what impact the decision had on the level of international conflict and tension (ranging from "increased significantly" to "decreased significantly"). The expert surveys have also been used by researchers to establish perceptions of democracy on the national level as well as on regional levels.[20]

One of the main advantages of expert surveys is that they are designed by the researcher deductively and thus allow for the creation of constructs according to his or her requirements. Therefore, an expert survey can ask a direct question without much further input from the researcher. Expert surveys also allow researchers to make sense of a multitude of sometimes contradictory documents and statements. The added value of an expert is that he or she is able to make a sensible evaluation based on his or her experience and to see a general policy profile that can become muddled in the jungle of different sources. Additionally, experts are knowledgeable about their subject and can make judgments based on already-existing data, documents, and publications—thus a researcher's need to engage with and interpret these data decreases.

In Table 1 we present a noncomprehensive overview of some of the expert surveys undertaken in comparative politics and international relations. The list represents the recent main trends and applications of the expert survey technique and demonstrates that establishing common standards for an expert survey is difficult, if one is to take the previous research as a yardstick. All of the listed expert surveys used more than three experts per case, though using six to ten experts per case seems to be an accepted standard. Similarly, although some scholars remain reluctant to ask experts about past events or use multiple time points, such queries have been successfully conducted.[21]

Survey Design

Our expert survey aims to map the policies of democratic countries toward Iran and North Korea.[22] Because policies were easiest to observe during times of crisis, we focused on times when the international community was confronted with a challenge to the nonproliferation regime either because norm violations had been detected or because

TABLE 1
The use of expert surveys in political science.

	Number of experts surveyed	Response rate	Number of cases	Number of time points	Expert per case ratio
Huber and Inglehart, 1995	800+	almost 40%	42	1	Authors aimed for five experts per case and achieved that in 35 of 42 cases
Ray, 1999	299	45%	17	4	8 (mean)
Schafer and Crichlow, 2002	34	~62%	33	various	All experts coded all cases
Benoit and Laver, 2006	5,947	28%	47 countries; 387 parties	1	21 (median)
König and Hug, 2006	82	n/a	27	1	3 (mean)
O'Malley, 2007	413 (15–30/country)	~63.4%	22 countries, 139 PMs	multiple (20- year span)	n/a
Gervasoni, 2010	155	n/a	24	1	6.46 (mean) (4–12)
Hooghe et al., 2010	629 (2002); 628 (2006)	39% (2002); 37% (2006)	24 countries, 171/188 parties	1	9–10

Sources: John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, ''Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies,'' *Party Politics* 1 (1995), pp. 73–111; L. Ray, ''Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey,'' *European Journal of Political Research* 36 (1999), pp. 283–306; Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, ''The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Quantitative Study Building on Groupthink,'' *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (2002), pp. 45–68; Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver, *Party Policy in Modern Democracies* (London: Routledge, 2006); Thomas König and Simon Hug, *Policy-Making Processes and the European Constitution: A Comparative Study of Member States and Accession Countries* (London: Routledge), 2006; Eoin O'Malley, ''The Power of Prime Ministers: Results of an Expert Survey,'' *International Political Science Review* 28 (2007), pp. 7–27; Carlos Gervasoni, ''Measuring Democracy through Expert Judgments: Lessons from Argentina's Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics,'' paper for American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, September 2–5, 2010; Liesbet Hooghe et al., ''Reliability and Validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys on Party Positioning,'' *European Journal of Political Research* 49 (2010), pp. 687–703.

obligations under the regime had been questioned.[23] Thus, policies toward North Korea were measured for 1993, 2003, 2006, and 2009. In 1993, North Korea announced for the first time that it intended to withdraw from the NPT; in 2003, it finally withdrew from the treaty. In 2006 it conducted its first nuclear test; in 2009 it conducted a second—both tests were accompanied by the test-firing of long-range missiles. Policies toward Iran were measured for 2002, when its nuclear program was revealed; 2006, when the IAEA published its report on Iran's NPT implementation, concluding that Iran had stepped up its enrichment efforts; and 2009, when secret nuclear facilities near Qom were uncovered.[24]

We divided the survey into two sections, based on the two nuclear aspirants under study: Iran and North Korea. In each section, we asked the expert to evaluate the actual policies (not policy preferences) of six countries toward a given nuclear aspirant at each of the time points, from "very accommodationist" to "very confrontational" (on a 7-point semantic differential scale).[25] Mitigating the effects of the positive bias to select positive values, all options had been numbered with positive values (that is, the scale ranged from 1 to 7).[26] We provided the experts with definitions of both confrontational behavior (making strong and far-ranging demands, pressing for hard solutions such as sanctions, and threatening or using military force) and accommodationist behavior (preferring compromise, expressing empathy, and seeking dialogue).

The six countries comprised the expert's own country, three other countries in the region, the United States, and Japan.[27] Including the United States and Japan in all of the surveys allowed us to study the impact of large numbers of respondents on the reliability of the data. We encouraged the experts to not answer questions on countries they did not feel knowledgeable about. Many experts used this opportunity.

Some have argued that questions concerning past policies engender memory problems that could lead to less reliable answers.[28] However, such research in comparative politics has been done: Schafer and Crichlow asked their experts to consider crises outcomes of twenty-five years earlier; O'Malley also asked experts about distant events.[29] In all cases, checks proved that the data were reliable and valid, so it seems reasonable to expect that experts, as opposed to "lay participants" in censuses or general surveys, tend to have reliable memories. Indeed, our data also show that there is no uniform or dramatic pattern of decreasing reliability of data with increasing time difference.[30] Our data thus show that with expert surveys, one can examine historical events without compromising the reliability of the data. In total, we asked 451 experts from forty-seven countries to complete the survey. These experts were researchers at universities or think tanks who study nuclear nonproliferation, or international security more broadly, though in the case of a few small countries we also asked foreign policy analysts. Having received 173 responses that had at least one valid answer, our response rate reached 38.36 percent.

Evaluating Data Reliability

Compared with the policy positions of political parties, states' security policies are more elusive because states prefer to retain maximum room for maneuver. Elections provide political parties with strong incentives to stand out with clearly defined positions in order to attract voters. In contrast, diplomats by and large aim at remaining flexible on issues of international security. We therefore expect higher degrees of disagreement among our experts than among experts on political parties.

Indeed, standard deviations in our data are slightly higher than, for example, in Leonard Ray's data on party orientations.[31] We follow Ray in identifying those expert judgments that deviate excessively from the mean as "suspect."[32] We then exclude them

from our sample and further exclude all time-points with fewer than three observations. If more than two time-points were eliminated from a particular country year, we also excluded the country from the analysis.

Findings and Trends

Our expert survey contributes to the study of nonproliferation by answering four main questions. First, how have policy responses toward Iran and North Korea developed over time—have countries become more (or less) confrontational or accommodationist in their policies? Second, has there been any convergence of policies among the countries under study; that is, have differences over the appropriate degree of confrontation or accommodation narrowed over time? Third (related to the previous), have there been any country-specific policy profiles; that is, do some countries generally prefer a more confrontational stance toward nuclear aspirants, while others generally opt for a more accommodationist policy? (If this is the case, which countries are most confrontational or accommodationist, in general?) Finally, have there been any differences in how democracies reacted to the challenges posed by Iran, on the one hand, and North Korea on the other hand?

Figure 1 depicts the overall trends in policies toward Iran and North Korea. In the figure's box plots, the thick lines represent the median, and the gray boxes represent the middle 50 percent of the data, with the second quartile above the mean and the third

FIGURE 1
Development of policies toward Iran and North Korea over time.



Note: Along the Y-axis, 1 denotes the most accommodationist position and 7 the most confrontational.

quartile below the mean.[33] "Whiskers"—the long vertical lines—represent the spread of data up to one-and-half-times of the interquartile range (the difference between the first and third quartiles). The dots above (or below) represent outliers within the data.

States moved toward a more confrontational position on Iran across time, even though the difference between overall policy responses in 2006 was only slightly more confrontational than in 2002. On the other hand, we observe a sizeable shift toward more confrontational policies in 2009. Two countries are also notable outliers, pursuing much more confrontational policy toward Iran compared to others: Israel (in all three years) and the United States (in 2002 and 2006) were strongly more confrontational compared with the rest of the sample. We will return to these two countries later.

In the case of North Korea, we observe a similar overall shift toward a more confrontational policy, but the shift is much more gradual and incremental. We observe only one outlier on the confrontational side: the United States in 2003, when North Korea withdrew from the NPT. There is also one outlier on the accommodationist side: Mongolia in 2003 and 2009.

We can thus conclude that the dynamics of policy change in the case of Iran were much stronger and more rapid when compared with the policy response to North Korea.

Toward a Policy Convergence?

Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of the policy positions toward Iran and North Korea for each time point. For the sake of comparison, we also include the medians and interquartile ranges.

Both standard deviations and interquartile ranges indicate that democracies have followed quite divergent policies toward Iran and North Korea. At any crisis period, both proponents of an accommodationist policy and those of a confrontational one had considerable numbers of followers.

Moreover, we observe a clear lack of convergence among states over time: there is no discernible trend of decreasing standard deviations or interquartile ranges. In the case

TABLE 2
Mean policy positions toward Iran and North Korea over time.

	Mean	Standard deviation	Median	Interquartile range
Iran, 2002	3.64	0.84	3.57	1.00
Iran, 2006	3.94	0.88	3.75	1.07
Iran, 2009	4.37	0.78	4.48	0.92
North Korea, 1993	3.95	0.86	4.00	1.07
North Korea, 2003	4.34	1.03	4.50	1.05
North Korea, 2006	4.50	1.07	4.53	1.66
North Korea, 2009	4.70	1.00	4.75	1.15

of Iran, there has been almost no convergence between 2002 and 2006 (in fact, the pattern is one of divergence) and only limited convergence between 2006 and 2009. In the case of North Korea, there was a pattern of divergence between 1993 and 2003 that barely changed thereafter. Thus, although liberal democracies share common values—and, on a general level, the perception that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international security—they have remained in considerable disagreement over the appropriate policy response to nuclear aspirants whenever a new violation of NPT obligations was detected.[34] What is more, even though democracies voted en bloc in the IAEA Board of Governors to request cooperation—ordering special inspections, referring Iran and North Korea to the UN Security Council, and imposing sanctions on Iran and North Korea via the Security Council—the underlying dispute about the appropriate policy remains. Even intense interactions among the members of NATO and of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy over a period of more than fifteen years have not narrowed differences over how to address the challenges posed by Iran and North Korea.[35] We will now further explore the characteristic policy profiles across individual states.

Country-Specific Policy Profiles

The results of the survey demonstrate states' remarkably stable policy profiles over time.[36] Although countries of course become more confrontational or accommodationist in response to the nuclear aspirant's behavior, many democracies keep a distinct policy profile, in that they remain more (or less) confrontational *in comparison* with other democracies.

Figures 2 and 3 represent the policy positions over time of selected countries toward Iran (Figure 2) and North Korea (Figure 3).[37] Country-specific policy profiles (lines that keep a characteristic distance to the others and rarely cross other lines) are especially discernible in the case of Iran: for example, the United States and the United Kingdom

FIGURE 2
Policy positions of selected countries toward Iran.



Note: Along the Y-axis, 1 denotes the most accommodationist position and 7 the most confrontational.

FIGURE 3
Policy positions of selected countries toward North Korea.



Note: Along the Y-axis, 1 denotes the most accommodationist position and 7 the most confrontational.

were *always* more confrontational than all other countries. On the other end of the spectrum, South Africa was *always* more accommodationist than all the other countries, except for Australia in 2009.

Of course, some countries have changed their policies in comparison with other states. As Figure 2 demonstrates, France adopted a position of neither conciliation nor confrontation at the beginning of the dispute and then clearly moved toward the most confrontational countries by 2009. Similarly, India moved from one of the most accommodationist countries toward more confrontation. Figure 3 also demonstrates that France and Germany moved closer toward the confrontational policy of the United States and the United Kingdom on North Korea as of 2006. Notwithstanding such policy changes, however, the *continuity* of policies in comparison with other states remains remarkably stable. Thus, on North Korea, the policy of the United States has been among the most confrontational ever since Pyongyang's withdrawal from the NPT. In contrast, Australia has *always* been more accommodationist than the other countries we selected. In the same vein, it is also interesting to note that (although they are not included in Figure 3) the policies of Estonia, Switzerland, Mongolia, Japan, and the Netherlands remained almost unchanged since 2003. All in all, we observe far fewer policy-position changes in the case of North Korea compared with developments in Iran—an intriguing phenomenon.

Do Nuclear Aspirants Face the Same Policy Response?

Finally, we use our data to assess whether Iran and North Korea have been treated in the same way; that is, whether they faced a similar degree of confrontation or accommodation

in response to their violations of nonproliferation norms. Of course, any such comparison is made difficult by the fact that Iran and North Korea violated nonproliferation norms in different ways: whereas Iran's nonproliferation violations are suspected to serve the maintenance of a secret weapons program (which Iran denies), North Korea withdrew from the NPT and carried out nuclear tests. Different as these behaviors may be, they both raise the question of whether norm-breakers are best addressed by confrontational or accommodationist strategies.[38] Because states have exhibited specific policy profiles toward individual nuclear aspirants over time, we may also expect similar policies toward both Iran and North Korea.

In order to see whether countries indeed treat nuclear aspirants differently or whether they prefer accommodationist or confrontational policies in general, we correlated our data on Iran and North Korea at individual time points. We found strong, positive, and significant correlations between policies toward both Iran and North Korea in 2002/2003, in 2006, and in 2009.[39] This indicates that at all points in time when Iran and North Korea can be compared, policies toward nuclear aspirants were driven by general considerations about how to respond to violations of NPT norms, independent of the nuclear aspirant under consideration. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the relationships between policies toward Iran, on the one hand, and North Korea on the other.[40] Countries positioned on the straight line across the graph prefer exactly the same degree of confrontation or accommodation toward Iran and North Korea. Countries above

FIGURE 4
Policies toward Iran and North Korea, 2002/2003.



FIGURE 5
Policies toward Iran and North Korea, 2006.



FIGURE 6
Policies toward Iran and North Korea, 2009.



the line were more confrontational toward North Korea than Iran, while countries below the line were more confrontational toward Iran.

The graphs demonstrate that, although few states prefer an *identical* degree of confrontation or accommodation toward the two nuclear aspirant states, many states prefer remarkably similar policies. In other words, states tend to prefer either confrontation or accommodation *in general*, rather than confronting one nuclear aspirant while accommodating the other. Obvious exceptions include Israel, which advocates a maximum degree of confrontation toward Iran but not North Korea, and Mongolia, which was consistently more confrontational toward Iran when compared with North Korea, although not to the same extent as Israel.

The graphs also demonstrate that most countries' policies toward North Korea have been more confrontational than their policies toward Iran (with Israel and Mongolia as the exceptions). These differences correspond with the fact that North Korea's actual nuclear tests posed a larger and more concrete threat to nonproliferation than Iran's more nascent and ambiguous nuclear program.

A few countries exhibited comparable patterns in their policy positions toward Iran and North Korea. The United States was always the most confrontational, while Australia was always among the least confrontational. The Netherlands' policy was remarkably stable over time, though its policy toward Iran shifted markedly between 2006 and 2009. Ireland followed a similar policy profile; it had a moderately accommodationist policy at the outset, followed by even more accommodationist shift, followed by a return to a moderately accommodationist policy. Switzerland followed a similar path; initially it moved toward a more confrontational policy, then its policy barely changed in subsequent periods. French policy, on the other hand, has consistently grown more confrontational toward Iran; with respect to its North Korea policy, the only pronounced shift was in 2006, toward more confrontation.

Looking back at Figure 1 and Table 2, we see that over time states have not come to any convergence of policy on the two ''nuclear aspirants.'' On the contrary, the standard deviations increase, suggesting that there was more divergence in states' policies toward both Iran and North Korea.

Exploring Cleavages among States

Although it is well beyond the scope of this article to explore the drivers of different states' policies, we nevertheless set out to explore one of the explanations frequently leveled, especially with a view to the Iranian nuclear program.[41] According to both policy insiders as well as academic accounts, a major cleavage within the IAEA Board of Governors runs along a North-South line, i.e., between countries that argue for a more interventionist form of global governance and others that maintain a restrictive interpretation of sovereignty and non-intervention.[42] Since the Cold War era, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has been a prominent voice of the latter—that is, the ''global South.'' We therefore explored whether this cleavage is present within our data. (Because there were no NAM members in

the sample of countries of whose policy toward North Korea we studied, only Iran is examined regarding this question.)

We conducted a simple, repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a single between-subject factor. The repeated measures represent multiple observations of the policy toward Iran (the three points in time mentioned above), and the between-subject factor is NAM membership. We observe a significant effect of NAM membership.[43] This indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between NAM members and non-members in their policy toward Iran. Subsequent Bonferroni-corrected contrasts reveal that NAM non-members were 0.8 points more confrontational toward Iran compared with NAM members ($p = 0.034$).

Although the repeated-measures ANOVA does not fully explain the difference, our results confirm that the NAM members do indeed have a more accommodationist policy toward nuclear aspirants in comparison to non-NAM states. Although the forces behind policy differences need to be further explored, this finding suggests that general ideas about the trade-off between effective nonproliferation governance, on the one hand, and respect for sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, on the other hand, play a role in states' considerations.

Conclusion

We used an expert survey to map democracies' policies toward two nuclear aspirants, Iran and North Korea. Based on the statements of some 170 experts, our analysis suggests four main findings.

First, the policies of democratic states toward both Iran and North Korea have become more confrontational over time. On average, democracies' policies toward Iran started out as accomodationist but turned significantly more confrontational in 2009; the change has been more gradual vis-à-vis North Korea. Second, there has not been any policy convergence over time among the states we studied. Given that nonproliferation policy is high on the international agenda and that some states have made considerable diplomatic efforts to create common policy positions toward the nuclear aspirants, it is remarkable that the question of whether an acommodationist or confrontational policy is more appropriate remains contested. Third, countries maintained stable policy profiles; that is, states generally remained more (or less) confrontational in comparison to others at all points in time. Fourth, states followed very similar policies toward both Iran and North Korea at any point; this policy coherence is noteworthy in light of obvious differences between the norm violations committed by the two nuclear aspirants.

Our data show that countries generally demonstrate relatively stable preferences for either confrontation or accommodation, suggesting that states have a default policy of either using diplomacy and positive incentives or sanctions and threats. An explorative study of the forces driving these default policies found that there is a major cleavage between members and non-members of the NAM. Whether democracies prefer accommodation or confrontation thus depends on their stance toward general questions

of respecting sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention; further research into states' policy choices is warranted.

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NOTES

1. The terminology stems from Kenneth Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, who analyze the security dilemma as a "two-level strategic predicament." The first level consists of a dilemma of interpretation that results from "the perceived need to make a decision in the existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others." See Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 4. On the security dilemma, see also John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2 (1950), pp. 157–80; and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). For the analysis of defiance to nuclear nonproliferation beyond the security dilemma taking into account the regime constraints, see Tanya Ogilvie-White, "The Defiant States: The Nuclear Diplomacy of North Korea and Iran," *Nonproliferation Review* 17 (2010), pp. 115–38.
2. William J. Long, *Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
3. "Bush Says Iran 'Will Be Dealt With'; Europe Hardens Stance; U.K., Iranian Officials to Hold Talks," Global Security Newswire, April 22, 2004.
4. Council of the European Union, "Fight against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction—EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," document no. 15656/03, December 10, 2003, <register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st15/st15708.en03.pdf>.
5. Gerhard Schröder, "Speech on the 41th Munich Conference on Security Policy," Munich Security Conference, February 12, 2005, <www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&id=143&sprache=en&>.
6. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*.
7. James W. Davis, *Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. 5.
8. Daniel W. Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 251ff.
9. Akan Malici, "Rogue States: Enemies of Our Own Making?," *Psicología Política* 39 (2009), pp. 39–54.
10. For recent empirical studies, see Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (2007), pp. 167–94; Matthew Kroenig, "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance," *American Political Science Review* 103 (2009), pp. 113–33. For less recent theoretical discussion, see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21 (1996), pp. 54–86.

11. Qualitative studies are rare but more common. See Ogilvie-White, "The Defiant States"; and Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro, eds., *Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Twenty-First Century Disarmament Dynamics* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 2012).
12. Although we have seen increasing numbers of split votes in the IAEA Board of Governors, consensus-seeking remains consistent. On voting in the UN General Assembly, see M.J. Peterson, *The UN General Assembly* (London: Routledge, 2006).
13. As indicators of policy similarity between states, roll-call data are otherwise used successfully by Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2007), pp. 166–91; and Curtis S. Signorino and Jeffrey M. Ritter, "Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999), pp. 115–44.
14. Ian Budge, "Expert Judgements of Party Policy Positions: Uses and Limitations in Political Research," *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (2000), pp. 103–33; and Thomas König, "Measuring and Analysing Positions on European Constitution-Building," *European Union Politics* 6 (2005), pp. 99–123.
15. Liesbet Hooghe, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigevich, Catherine De Vries, Erica Edwards, Gary Marks, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova, "Reliability and Validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys on Party Positioning," *European Journal of Political Research* 49 (2010), pp. 687–703.
16. Leonard Ray, "Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey," *European Journal of Political Research* 36 (1999), pp. 283–306; Hooghe et al., "Reliability and Validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys on Party Positioning"; Marco Steenbergen and Gary Marks, "Evaluating Expert Judgments," *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (2007), pp. 347–66; John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, "Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies," *Party Politics* 1 (1995), pp. 73–111; König, "Measuring and Analysing Positions on European Constitution-Building"; and Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver, *Party Policy in Modern Democracies* (London: Routledge, 2006).
17. Eoin O'Malley, "The Power of Prime Ministers: Results of an Expert Survey," *International Political Science Review* 28 (2007), pp. 7–27.
18. Ibid., p. 11.
19. Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, "The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Quantitative Study Building on Groupthink," *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (2002), pp. 45–68.
20. Carlos Gervasoni, "Measuring Democracy through Expert Judgments: Lessons from Argentina's Survey of Experts on Provincial Politics," paper for American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, September 2–5, 2010.
21. An example of an expert survey that did not inquire about the past or use multiple time points is Hooghe et al., "Reliability and Validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys on Party Positioning."
22. All data gathered in our survey will be made available online, <home.fsw.vu.nl/wm.wagner/data.html>. The exclusive focus on democratic countries is due to the broader program of the research project Rehabilitation or Retribution?, which is financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research and of which this expert survey forms a part. To identify the democracies whose policies toward Iran and North Korea we wanted to study, we draw on the Polity IV database, which has become widely employed in international relations and comparative politics research to measure the "democraticness" of a country. (The Polity project was founded by Ted Gurr in the 1970s; the Polity IV database is located at the Center for Systemic Peace at George Mason University and directed by Monty G. Marshall, <www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>.) It includes an 11-point democracy scale (0 to 10) and an 11-point autocracy scale (0 to 10). A country's regime type ("combined Polity score") is then measured by subtracting its autocracy score from its democracy score yielding a 21-point scale (−10 to +10). Although a score of 7 is often used as a threshold for considering any country a democracy, we apply a more restrictive measure because we wanted to include only those states whose democratic character is uncontested (that is, we want to exclude "illiberal" or "defect" democracies). We therefore included only states with a combined Polity score of at least 9 over the periods under study (from 2002 to 2009 in the case of Iran and from 1993 to 2009 in the case of North Korea). Forty-two countries qualified as uncontested democracies for the period from 2002 to 2009: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, *Costa Rica*, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,

Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, *Jamaica,* Japan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Netherlands, *New Zealand,* Norway, Panama, *Peru,* Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, *Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago,* United Kingdom, United States, and *Uruguay*. Thirty-one countries qualified as uncontested democracies for the period from 1993 to 2009: Australia, *Austria,* Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, *Finland,* France, Germany, Greece, *Hungary,* Ireland, Israel, Italy, *Jamaica,* Japan, Lithuania, *Mauritius,* Mongolia, Netherlands, *New Zealand*, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, *Spain,* Sweden, Switzerland, *Trinidad and Tobago,* United Kingdom, United States, and *Uruguay*. All of these countries have been democratic (measured by score of 9 or more on the Polity IV index) for the whole duration of the disputes with the nuclear aspirants. Countries that are italicized were excluded from the study due to an insufficient number of expert judgments.

23. Although our focus on crisis episodes makes the observation of policy differences easier, it also introduces a bias toward more confrontational behavior. We owe this point to one of the peer reviewers.

24. It is important to note that in 2009 policies toward Iran were not only influenced by the IAEA's report that Iran was continuing to enrich uranium (published in February 2009), but also by Iran's violent suppression of protests against the rigged presidential elections of June 12, 2009.

25. Semantic differential scales are considered to efficiently approximate interval (continuous) data. See Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim Futing Liao, eds., *The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods* (London: SAGE, 2003); Scott M. Smith and Gerald S. Albaum, *Fundamentals of Marketing Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005); William G. Zikmund and Barry J. Babin, *Essentials of Marketing Research*, fourth edition (Mason, Ohio: South-Western/CENGAGE Learning, 2010). Such treatment enables us to calculate means and standard deviations. Both Ray, "Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration"; and Hooghe et al., "Reliability and Validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys on Party Positioning" utilize the same treatment. Our online appendix provides detailed information about the measures of central tendency of our data beyond means and standard deviations, see <home.fsw.vu.nl/wm.wagner/data.html>.

26. Roger Tourangeau, Lance J. Rips, and Kenneth A. Rasinski, *The Psychology of Survey Response* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

27. For experts who work in countries different than the country of their nationality, country of nationality and the country of residence were both considered as "home," but only the country about which expert wrote extensively was considered "home" for the determination of regional affiliation.

28. W. Lawrence Neuman, *Social Science Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 2003); Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski, *The Psychology of Survey Response*.

29. Schafer and Crichlow, "The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision Making"; and O'Malley, "The Power of Prime Ministers."

30. We correlated the time elapsed from the episode assessment and the measurement with the standard deviation for the given observation. If extended time since the event worsens experts' judgment, the standard deviations should be higher—in terms of correlations, they are expected to be positive and statistically significant. This is not the case. Pearson Correlation: $r(187) = -0.042$, $p = 0.57$.

31. Whereas the standard deviation in Ray's data is up to 0.97, it is 1.1 in our data sample.

32. With an average (and median) of 0.2 on our seven-point scale, the effect of excluding excessively deviant experts is limited. In order to check the robustness of the findings we present in this article, we re-run all analyses also with excessively deviant experts included; our main findings remain.

33. Medians were almost equal to means in our data; the difference between them ranged from less than 0.01 to 0.19.

34. As the example of Israel and Iran makes clear, differences about the immediacy and severity of the threat of nuclear proliferation persist.

35. This is surprising if one shares the expectation of many constructivist scholars that intense interactions among state representatives would foster shared perceptions and values that in turn would lead to a truly common policy. See Kenneth Glarbo, "Wide-Awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union," *Journal of European Public Policy* 6 (1999), pp. 634–51; Knud Erik Jørgensen, "PoCo: The Diplomatic Republic of Europe," in Knud Erik Jørgensen, ed., *Reflective Approaches to European Governance* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997); Michael E. Smith, "Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Co-Operation," *Journal of European*

Public Policy 7 (2000), pp. 613–31; and Ben Tonra, "The Impact of Political Cooperation," in Jørgensen, ed., *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*.

36. Graphs depicting exact country patterns, as well as more detailed data, are available online, <home.fsw.vu.nl/wm.wagner/data.html>.
37. We decided to present only a selection of countries because any graph of the complete sample would make any recognition of individual lines almost impossible. We decided to include the most powerful states of our sample, i.e. the permanent members of the UN Security Council: the United States, United Kingdom and France, the regional powers Japan, India, Australia and South Africa, as well as Germany and Italy. Unfortunately, we lack data on Indian and South African policies towards North Korea because not enough experts found themselves competent enough to assess their policies in this case. Data and graphs for all countries are available at <home.fsw.vu.nl/wm.wagner/data.html>.
38. For the underlying philosophies of how to deal with deviant behavior see Wolfgang Wagner, "Rehabilitation or Retribution? Cultures of Control and Policies Towards Rogue States," inaugural lecture, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, October 4, 2010, <home.fsw.vu.nl/wm.wagner/wagner_inaugural_text.pdf>.
39. For 2002/2003: Pearson correlation $r(20) = 0.41$, $p < 0.1$ (significant at 10 percent level); 2006: Pearson correlation $r(20) = 0.44$, $p < 0.1$ (significant at 10 percent level); 2009: Pearson correlation $r(22) = 0.49$, $p < 0.05$ (significant at 5 percent level).
40. These graphs display only the positions of the countries for which policy positions toward both Iran and North Korea are available.
41. For a more comprehensive discussion of explanatory factors, see Wolfgang Wagner and Michal Onderco, "Commercial Interests or Cultures of Control? Explaining Differences in Policies Towards So-Called 'Rogue States,'" paper presented at Second British-German IR Conference, University of St Andrews, Scotland, December 19–21, 2011.
42. For a policy account, see Mohamed El Baradei, *The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times* (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt and Co., 2011). For academic accounts, see Ogilvie-White, "The Defiant States"; and Tanya Ogilvie-White, "International Responses to Iranian Nuclear Defiance: The Non-Aligned Movement and the Issue of Non-Compliance," *European Journal of International Law* 18 (2007), p. 476.
43. Here, $F(1,31) = 4.9$, $p = 0.03$.